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The Doctor as Witness: Statements for Purposes of
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment
WILLIAM H. THEIS*
INTRODUCTION

The evidentiary rules on statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment have great importance in the trial of personal
injury cases.' The typical factual setting, in broad outline, is easily
stated. The injured plaintiff visits a doctor and describes his aches,
pains, and suffering. He may make statements to the doctor about
the cause of his troubles. If called to testify at trial, the doctor may
be asked to repeat the patient's assertions. These statements may
often constitute hearsay and will be inadmissible unless an exception to the hearsay rule is found.
This article examines the present state of Illinois law governing
the admissibility of such statements. Treatment of this issue under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) is explored as an alternative permitting broader admissibility. Finally, the impact of adopting the
federal approach, as would have occurred under the proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence, is assessed.
GENERAL DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

The Rationale for the Hearsay Rule
The Illinois law can best be understood by considering the general
development of the doctrine admitting statements made by an injured declarant.2 Initially, the common law admitted, as an exception to the hearsay rule, spontaneous expressions of pain and suffering3 without regard to whom the declarant made his statement. The
courts emphasized two considerations. A spontaneous statement of
pain and suffering, even as related by someone other than the injured person, offered the best evidence of the suffering and its true
character. The afflicted person's reconstruction in a courtroom of
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law.
1. These rules are also applicable in the criminal context. See People v. Ward, 61 1I1. 2d
559, 205 N.E.2d 425 (1975); People v. Gant, 58 Ill. 2d 178, 317 N.E.2d 564 (1977). However,
the issue is more likely to arise in tort litigation.

2.
TIAL

See generally J.

WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERicAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
AT COMMON LAW §§ 1718-1723, at 63-69 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE

(3d ed.)]. See also Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 778 (1971).
3. See Foster, Present Sense Impressions: An Analysis and A Proposal, 10 Loy. Cm. L.J.
299 (1979).
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his past suffering often provided a poor substitute for statements
made while he felt the injury. In these cases, "necessity" formed a
basis for admissibility.' Moreover, being spontaneous and contemporary with the pain, the statements were considered to have
greater probative value. A spontaneous statement, which by definition implies a lack of premeditation, gave some indication of
for the courts to admit
trustworthiness. It was common, therefore,
5
such statements as part of the res gestae.
Statements to physicians might be just as spontaneous as statements to witnesses of an injury in the sense that the declarant,
wracked with pain, will still blurt out the truth with no dissembling.
Such statements, however, might be less spontaneous in the sense
that they occur some time after injury and, more importantly, in
response to searching questions by the doctor. As this ambiguity in
the meaning of "spontaneous" became apparent, the decisions
down-played the necessity principle and emphasized the trustworthiness of such statements. In doing so, the opinions also changed
the focus of "trustworthiness." The patient's desire for effective
treatment, and not the immediacy of the statement, became the
guarantor of trustworthiness!
Illinois, like many other jurisdictions,7 admits testimony of a
treating physician which relates the patient's out-of-court statements of his condition, symptoms, and suffering. The development
of the rationale supporting this exception to the hearsay rule has
followed the general doctrinal pattern. The Illinois Supreme Court,
when first deciding the issue in 1867, approved a physician's testimony relating the patient's statement of bodily condition "[I1f said
under circumstances which free [the patient's statement] from all
suspicion of being spoken with reference to future litigation, and
give it the character of res gestae." 8 By 1954, the court's emphasis
4.
5.
6.

WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 2, §§1714, 1718, at 57-60, 63-64.

See, e.g., Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Sutton, 42 Ill. 438, 440 (1867).
McCormick's modem statement of the rationale is typical:
Although statements to physicians are not likely to be spontaneous, since they are
usually made in response to questions, their reliability is assured by the likelihood
that the patient believes that the effectiveness of the treatment he receives may
depend largely upon the accuracy of the information he provides the physician.
E. CIzAnY, et. al., McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF Evm ,Ec.§292, at 690 (2d ed.
1972)[hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK (2d ed.)]. See Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538
(2d Cir. 1940).
7. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 778, 783 (1971).
8. Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Sutton, 42 111. 438, 440 (1867). Later cases maintained the reference
to "res gestae."See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485, 488, 86 N.E. 256, 257 (1908); City
of Salem v. Webster, 192 Ill. 369, 372, 61 N.E. 323, 324 (1901); West Chicago St. Ry. v.
Kennelly, 170 11. 508, 512, 48 N.E. 996, 997 (1897). Shaughnessy also reasons that the
patient's desire for treatment gives a guarantee of trustworthiness.
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had changed: "[It is presumed that a person will not falsify such
statements to a physician from whom he expects and hopes to receive medical aid." 9
The courts consider an individual seeking treatment likely to
make truthful statments regarding his condition because he wants
the doctor's best-informed judgment as to the course of treatment
he should undergo. This policy basis for the exception, although
widely invoked and usually unquestioned, is open to inquiry and
criticism. The rule assumes a patient who suffers genuine illness.
More importantly, it assumes the patient has minimal ability to
reject the advised course of treatment. If the patient suffers from no
illness at all, however, he may either reject the treatment, sometimes without informing his physician, or may follow the treatment,
as long as he has a reasonable expectation that the treatment will
have no deleterious effects. For example, a patient complaining of
"whiplash" has little to lose by so representing to his doctor. If the
doctor prescribes pain-killers and a cervical collar, the patient
might easily disregard the treatment without ever informing his
doctor. He might choose to follow the treatment with little danger
to his actual good health.
It is impossible to determine which stereotype is predominant:
the patient who makes truthful disclosure for fear that his health
will be further endangered if he misleads his doctor or the patient
who manufactures symptoms, secure that he can do himself no
harm. The law has assumed the honest patient in accepting these
statements for the truth of the matter asserted.
In actual practice, this assumption may make little difference to
the outcome of the case. The patient will usually have given his own
testimony as to the matters related to the doctor and is himself
subject to cross-examination. The facts in a given case may raise the
jurors' suspicions that the patient gave his doctor false information.
Furthermore, the doctor's testimony is also subject to crossexamination, which may establish that the doctor is relating the
patient's statements without vouching for their truthfulness. It is,
therefore, unlikely that the false statement will go undetected in the
majority of cases.
When the patient is unavailable at trial, usually because of his
death, this exception to the hearsay rule may present the potential
for significant impact on the outcome. In this situation, the doctor's
testimony may well be the only competent evidence as to the truth
of the matters contained in the patient's statement. In spite of the
9.

Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Ill.
2d 590, 602, 119 N.E. 2d 224, 231 (1954).
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reduced opportunity to ascertain the patient's veracity, the rationale behind the exception leads to admissibility.
No reported Illinois case has raised the issue of whether the doctor's testimony as to pain and suffering need be corroborated. The
Illiniois courts long rejected any testimony by the doctor as to causation of injuries.' 0 The application of this rule often arose in situations where the doctor's testimony would have been uncorroborated,
if admitted. The easing of this rule has occurred in cases where the
doctor's testimony has been corroborated. Although corroboration
has not been explicitly required, it might be rash to discount the
necessity of corroborative evidence.
DISTINCTIONS BASED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE STATEMENT

Statements of Present and Past Pain
Reliance on the patient's desire for effective treatment as the
basis for the hearsay exception does not limit the physician to only
those symptoms which bothered the patient at the time the statement was made. The patient's complaint of prior pain and suffering
may also be admissible since both present and past pain could form
the basis for diagnosis and treatment.
It has been observed that statements of past pain should be excluded as less trustworthy because they are more capable of simulation." This position places too much emphasis on the patient's
suffering as the only guarantee of truthfulness. Spontaneity, in the
sense of an unpremeditated response occasioned by pain, may be a
necessary indication of truthfulness in some situations, but it is not
crucial to the doctor-patient relationship.' 2 If it is assumed that a
patient seeks treatment for present ailments which may have also
troubled him in the past, a full and complete history will be taken
and relied upon by his treating physician. The trustworthiness problems posed by admitting statements under these circumstances are
minimal.
Much more difficult to deal with is the patient claiming only past
pain and no present symptoms. If the patient claims to seek a tardy
treatment for past ailments in fear that they may re-occur, his statements should be no less admissible, although perhaps more suspect.
The patient who suffers no present pain or symptoms may be seeking an expert witness and not actual treatment. As long as he seeks
10.

See notes 14-16 infra and accompanying text.
WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 2, §1722, at 77-78.
12. This relationship is often non-spontaneous in the sense already noted. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
11.
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treatment, however, the same presumption of truthfulness should
prevail.
The Illinois courts do not recognize a distinction between past and
present pain. Physicians may testify about the patient's statements
of both kinds of suffering."
Statements of Causation
Whether the treating physician may relate the patient's statements about the cause of his injuries is the most troublesome aspect
of the hearsay exception. For years, the Illinois courts adhered rigidly" to the traditional and widely recognized rule 5 that such statements may not be admitted into evidence."
Th6 original rationale for the exception partially explains this
rigidity. A patient's statement as to causation does not satisfy the
necessity principle. For this issue, his spontaneous statements during his suffering would be no more complete nor helpful than his
direct testimony at trial. Pain is more difficult to reconstruct and
relate than causation. If his injuries should result in death, his legal
representative has a very real "need" for the deceased's out-of-court
statements, but the necessity principle operated in the more narrow
sense already noted.
"Spontaneity" provides a less satisfactory explanation for the traditional inadmissibility of causal statements. The statement of
cause and effect was evidently regarded as perhaps too large an
endeavor for an individual making "spontaneous" statements while
he was wracked with pain. The suspicion of falsification was perhaps stronger when the causation issue was involved. Whether in13. See Cuneo Press Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 341 Ill. 569, 572, 173 N.E. 470, 471 (1930);
West Chicago St. Ry. v. Kennelly, 170 Ill. 508, 512, 48 N.E. 996, 997 (1897). But see County
of Winnebago v. City of Rockford, 61 Ill. App. 656, 660 (1895). A number of jurisdictions reject
statements of past pain. See Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 195 Mass. 100, 80 N.E. 799 (1907);
People v. Hawkins, 109 N.Y. 408, 17 N.E. 371 (1888).
14. In one case for recovery of accidental death insurance benefits, the deceased patient
was himself a doctor. The court's ruling of inadmissibility should give some idea of the fervor
with which Illinois courts have enforced the "causation" qualification to the hearsay exception. See Globe Accident Ins. Co. v. Gerisch, 163 Ill. 625, 45 N.E. 563 (1896).
15. WIGMoRE (3d ed.), supra note 2, §1722, at 74-77.
16. Spiegel's House Furnishing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 288111. 422, 123 N.E. 606 (1919);
Peoria Cordage Co. v. Industrial Bd., 284 Ill. 90, 119 N.E. 996 (1918); Chicago & Alton R.R.
v. Industrial Rd., 274 Ill. 236, 113 N.E. 629 (1916); Stevens v. People, 215 Ill. 593, 74 N.E.
786 (1905); Globe Accident Ins. Co. v. Gerisch, 163 fI1. 625, 45 N.E. 563 (1896); Collins v.
Waters, 54 Ill. 485 (1870); David v. Commercial Mut. Accident Co., 166 Ill. App. 490 (1911);
City of Aurora v. Plummer, 122 Ill. App. 143 (1905).
The first Illinois case to recognize the treating physician exception to the hearsay rule
nonetheless ruled inadmissible the doctor's account of the patient's statement that his injuries were caused by the defendant's conduct. Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Sutton, 42 IIl. 438 (1867).
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jured persons are less "spontaneous" in their statements of causation than in their statements of pain and suffering is an impossible
judgment to make, except on the basis of hunch. The suspicion may
be justified because the causation issue is often more difficult to
prove than the damages issue, especially when the declarant has
died and there is no corroboration of the doctor's proposed testimony.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in a 1954 decision frequently noted
by commentators," seemingly broke from its rigid position. In Shell
Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission," a claimant for workmen's compensation asserted that he injured his back when he fell in the
course of his employment. Although the opinion does not specifically state, presumably the claimant, who was injured but not
killed, testified to the facts underlying his claim. His doctor was
allowed to testify to the patient's statement of these facts made
during treatment. The court stated in allowing this testimony:
declarations of an injured person to his treating physician as to his
physical condition, and the cause thereof are admitted in evidence
for the reason that it is presumed that a person will not falsify such
statements to a physician
from whom he expects and hopes to
9
receive medical aid.
The court relied on the modern guarantee of trustworthiness, the
patient's desire for treatment, and ignored the more traditional
bases for the exception. In this casual manner, the court turned its
back on numerous decisions to the contrary, not even acknowledging the major change it may have wrought.
Testimony as to causation has been upheld in one other supreme
court case. 0 In People v. Gant,2 an assault victim refused to testify
at trial because she did not want to harm the defendant, her boyfriend. Her doctor, however, was allowed to state that she had told
him that she had been struck on the head by a shotgun and that
the gun discharged. She further told her doctor that she knew her
attacker, although she did not name him. The doctor testified that
he had asked her about the causation of her wound in order to have
a "better understanding" of her problem. He had been previously
17. Fmn. R. Evm. 803(4), Advisory Comm. Notes.
18. 2 Ill. 2d 590, 119 N.E.2d 224 (1954).
19. Id. at 602, 119 N.E.2d at 231 (emphasis added).
20. Shell Oil Co. was approved, but not applied, in Jensen v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 24 Ill.
2d 383, 182 N.E.2d 211 (1962). For an application, see Koenig v. 399 Corp., 97 Ill. App. 2d
345, 240 N.E.2d 164 (1968).
21. 58 III. 2d 178, 317 N.E.2d 564 (1974).
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told that she had received a gunshot wound but, from his own examination, had diagnosed a blow from a blunt instrument.
The court's opinion is unclear, but the doctor's statement was
evidently offered to prove that the victim had been unlawfully
struck and that, inferentially, the defendant performed the unlawful act. If the court admitted the statement for this purpose, it went
well beyond the current trend to admit statements concerning causation. The modern view stresses that statements "fixing fault" may
not be received.2"
The decision raises additional questions because it seems to focus
on the importance which the doctor attributes to such information,
not on the importance which the patient might reasonably think
that the doctor attributes to such information. Perhaps the doctor's
asking a question regarding this issue serves to validate the court's
judgment that a patient would answer truthfully in order to obtain
effective treatment. Whether objective relevance or relevance reasonably perceived by the patient controls admissibility is a question
yet to be resolved. The modern development of the position on noncausative statements has always focused on the patient's perceptions; it is likely that development of doctrine on causative statements will follow the same pattern.
Even if the premise that patients truthfully relate symptoms because they desire effective treatment is accepted, it is more difficult
to accept that they consider statements as to causation of equal
importance for receiving adequate care. It is even less likely that
they would consider the identity of the causative factor to have any
relationship to proper treatment. In Gant, for example, the victim
could falsely assert that Gant had hit her with the shotgun and not
fear that this lie to her doctor would affect her treatment. In Shell
Oil, if the claimant had fallen and injured his back when working
on his plumbing in the basement, a statement that he fell on the
job is a lie with no penalty arising out of the treatment process. The
identity of the causative factor is relevant only to the litigation; who
caused the assault is the key to a criminal prosecution, and where
the accident occurred is the key to workmen's compensation litigation. For this reason, hearsay statements of a general causative
nature could be admissible since they may relate to treatment;
statements as to particular identity should not be admitted through
the exception.
In both Gant and Shell Oil, the physician's testimony was corro22. See FED. R. Evn. 803(4), Advisory Comm. Notes; McCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 6,
at 691.
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borated on the issues to which the statements were related. It remains to be seen whether the Illinois courts would allow a treating
physician's testimony to stand as sole support on an issue of causation, especially with regard to identity. To read Shell Oil broadly
as allowing uncorroborated statements by physicians as to causation is premature.
Even if courts are willing to accept statements as to causation,
some discrimination in the choice of "causal" facts should be exercised. Illinois Central Railroad v. Sutton illustrates that the patient23
may not be in a position to attribute causation authoritatively.
The defendant's agents wrongfully ejected plaintiff from a train,
which necessitated his walking a mile or two to the nearest station.
At trial, his doctor testified that the patient told him that this walk
aggravated a pre-existing illness. The doctor gave no opinion of his
own as to causation. In reversing, the supreme court noted that
while the facts might support a jury verdict as to causation, the
plaintiff could not render an opinion on causation and transmit it
through his doctor.
DISTINCTIONS BASED ON STATUS OF THE WITNESS

Using the patient's desire for effective treatment as support for
the hearsay exception also raises questions of who may testify concerning the patient's statements. The rationale explains the Illinois
courts' willingness to extend the exception beyond medical doctors
to osteopathic doctors. 2 How far Illinois extends the rule beyond the
common law exception of doctors and interns is not clear.?, Consistent with the rationale, however, statements to anyone the patient
might reasonably think is in a position to treat his illness or to assist
in that treatment should be admissible.
While the treating physician is clearly within the exception, the
examining physician, under Illinois law, 26 may not relate what the
23. 42 Ill. 438 (1867). See also W. KING & D. PILLNGER, A STUDY
95 (1942).

OF THE LAw OF OPINION

EVIDENCE IN ILuNos

24. See Smith v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 165 Ill. App. 190 (1911).
25. An intern was not permitted to relate the patient's statements in Chicago Packing Co.
v. Industrial Bd., 282 Ill. 497, 118 N.E. 727 (1918).
A chiroprator has been allowed to testify, Voight v. Industrial Comm'n, 297 Ill. 109, 130
N.E. 470 (1921), as have nurses, Hammer v. Slive, 35 111. App. 2d 447, 183 N.E.2d 49 (1962);
Homey v. St. Louis & N.E.R. R., 165 Ill. App. 597 (1911). Dictum in People v. Noble, 42 111.
2d 425, 248 N.E.2d 96 (1969), indicates that a clinical psychologist would also be able to so
testify.
26. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485, 86 N.E. 256 (1908); Greinke v. Chicago
City Ry., 234 111.564, 85 N.E. 327 (1908); Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Giese, 229 111.260,
82 N.E. 232 (1907); Chicago & E.I.R.R. v. Donworth, 203 Ill. 192, 67 N.E. 797 (1903); West
Chicago St. R.R. v. Car, 170 Ill. 478, 48 N.E. 992 (1897); Korleski v. Needham, 77 Ill. App.
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patient has told him. The appropriate test for separating these two
breeds of doctor, therefore, assumes no small importance in personal
injury litigation.
The rationale for admitting the treating doctor's testimony suggests the rationale for excluding the testimony of an examining
doctor. If the patient is presumed to tell the truth when he wants
effective treatment, the law should assume no similar reliability
when the patient is describing his illness to a doctor from whom he
does not seek treatment. When the patient seeks an expert for purposes of testifying, he seeks only to better his legal position; he not
only lacks the motivation to be truthful, but he actually has a motivation to be untruthful. Of course, even the neophyte lawyer could
develop these probabilities through cross-examination and argument; however, the traditional view regards such testimony as too
dangerous to be admissible.Y
The rationale also provides a general guideline for the identification of the examining physician: characterization and admissibility
should properly rest on the actual expectation of the patient that
he will receive treatment from the doctor whose testimony counsel
2
later seeks to elicit.
Unfortunately, the Illinois cases provide little helpful guidance on
the actual test used. The opinions all too often merely state that a
doctor falls into one or the other class and assigns the predictable
consequences to that characterization. 9 The remaining cases typically provide negative guidelines rather than comprehensive criteria. For example, a doctor need not prescribe treatment to be
considered a treating physician. 0 If he does, the patient's failure to
follow the advice given will not change the characterization .' A
doctor is not an examining physician merely because he spoke with
2d 328, 222 N.E.2d 334 (1966); Melford v. Gaus & Brown Constr. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 497,
151 N.E.2d 128 (1958).
The Illinois cases maintaining this distinction parallel the law obtaining in many other
jurisdictions. See MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 6, §293, at 693.
27. Accord, W. KING & D. PILLINGER, A STUDY OF THE LAw OF OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS
97 (1942).
28. See Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 111. 2d 590, 602, 119 N.E.2d 224, 231 (1954).
29. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 11. 488, 86 N.E. 256 (1908); Greinke v. Chicago
City Ry. Co., 234 IIl. 564, 85 N.E. 327 (1908); .Chicago & E.I.R.R. v. Donworth, 203 I1. 192,
67 N.E. 797 (1903); Korleski v. Needham, 77 111. App. 2d 328, 222 N.E.2d 334 (1966); Conway
App. 2d 190, 215 N.E.2d 303 (1966); Melford v. Gaus & Brown Constr.
v. Tamborini, 68 111.
Co., 17 II. App. 2d 497, 151 N.E.2d 128 (1958).
30. See Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 11 IIl. 2d 186, 142 N.E.2d 104 (1957). But see
Elward v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 161 Ill. App. 630, 637 (1911).
31. Conway v. Tamborini, 68 I1. App. 2d 190, 215 N.E.2d 303 (1966).
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the patient after suit was filed;"2 neither does one become a treating physician merely because he spoke with the patient before suit
was filed.

33

Two significant questions of characterization are apparent. To
what extent do the doctor's expectations about, or understanding of,
his role affect his status? One opinion hints that if the doctor regards himself as an examining physician then the court will so regard him. 34 Ultimately, the test should center around the patient's
expectations because it is the patient's expectations which determine his statements. If on this foundation fact, however, the doctor's expectation is uncontradicted by the patient, the doctor's state
of mind should support a finding that he is an examining physician.5

The more difficult question is whether a doctor must be exclusively a treating or an examining physician. Could he perform both
functions? How should the law treat his testimony if he does so? The
cases seem to adopt the rule that an examining doctor is one whose
sole function is to examine; s8 a treating doctor may both treat the
patient and examine him with a view to trial. In many cases, this
analysis can be supported because treatment and examination are
integrally related.
It is a hypothetical case that raises the analytical difficulty. Assume that the doctor provides treatment. At some later date, the
patient returns, not for treatment but for examination with a view
toward trial. Since the patient expects no treatment, it could be
argued that statements made at this later time do not satisfy the
trustworthiness test. On the other hand, the treating doctor's familiarity with the patient's actual symptoms may deter the patient
from making untruthful statements at the examination prior to
trial. While the doctor's familiarity may guarantee some truthfulness, the argument against admissibility is not satisfied. Particularly where the symptoms are of a subjective nature, the patient, in
an effort to secure favorable testimony, may be able to feign injuries
that have healed since treatment ended.
39, 71 N.E. 28 (1904); Ryan v. Monson, 33 111.
32. Chicago City Ry. Co. v Bundy, 210 Ill.
App. 2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449 (1961); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Doran, 3 Ill. App. 2d 383, 122
App. 2d 190, 215 N.E.2d 303 (1966).
N.E.2d 450 (1954). Accord, Conway v. Tamborini, 68 Ill.
33. See Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Sutton, 42 Ill. 438, 440 (1867).
34. Casey v. Chicago City Ry., 237 Il1. 140, 86 N.E. 606 (1908).
35. See Jensen v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 24 111.2d 383, 182 N.E.2d 211 (1962).
36. Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Ill. 2d 590, 602, 119 N.E.2d 224, 231 (1954);
Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485, 488, 86 N.E. 256, 257 (1908); Greinke v. Chicago City Ry.,
564, 571, 85 N.E. 327, 330 (1908); Melford v. Gaus & Brown Constr. Co., 17 Il. App.
234 Ill.
2d 497, 504, 151 N.E.2d 128, 131 (1958).
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The Illinois decisions are split on this issue although the weight
of authority favors admissibility. While apparently accepting the
proposition that a patient might still hope for effective treatment
resulting even from an examination on the eve of trial, the decisions
leave open the possibility that the length of time between consultations for treatment and those for examination might influence the
outcome. 7
Unlike the treating physician, the examining doctor's testimony
is limited to objective conditions observed during his examination.
He may not relate the patient's physical manifestations of symptoms or the patient's conduct if this activity is capable of being
feigned by the patient." The patient's statements, as subjective
conduct, are similarly treated. The patient's ability to affect the
examination through his behavior, even though the doctor feels
qualified to detect "cheaters," renders the results inadmissible .31
Dickeson v. Baltimore & O.C.T.R. emphasizes that the objectivity of the test controls admissibility of the examining physician's testimony. To rebut a defense of contributory negligence in a
personal injury case, the minor plaintiff asserted his subnormal intelligence, offering the testimony of a psychologist that, based on
tests given the plaintiff, the boy had a sub-normal IQ. The defendant objected to an opinion based upon test responses which the
plaintiff might have formulated in a calculated effort to aid his case.
The court admitted the evidence on the foundation testimony that
the tests were objective. The witness' assertion that the tests were
objective laid a sufficient foundation. That the tests, not the witness, could detect falsification was crucial."
Closely analyzed, Dickeson raised the two issues most prevalent
37. Compare Fuhry v. Chicago City Ry., 239 Il1. 548, 88 N.E. 221 (1909) and Quirk v.
Schramm, 333 Il. App. 293, 77 N.E.2d 417 (1948) with Horstman v. Chicago Ry., 210 Ill. App.
144 (1913) and Barnes v. Chicago City Ry., 147 Ill.
App. 601 (1909).
38. Jensen v. Elgin, J.& E. Ry., 24 111.2d 383, 182 N.E.2d 211 (1962); National Malleable
& Steel Castings Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 377 Ill.
169, 36 N.E.2d 249 (1941); Fuhry v.
Chicago City Ry., 239 Ill.
548, 88 N.E. 221 (1909); Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Il. 485, 86 N.E.
256 (1908); Greinke v. Chicago City Ry., 234 Ill.
564, 85 N.E. 327 (1908); Chicago City Ry. v.
Shreve, 226 Ill.
530, 80 N.E. 1049 (1907); Chicago & E.I.R.R. v. Donworth, 203 Ill.
192, 67
N.E. 797 (1903); Hastings v. Abernathy Taxi Ass'n, 16 Ill.
App. 3d 671, 306 N.E.2d 498 (1973);
Korleski v. Needham, 77 Ill.
App. 2d 328, 222 N.E.2d 334 (1966); Gaydos v. Peterson, 300
Ill.
App. 219, 20 N.E.2d 837 (1939); Barnes v. Chicago City Ry., 147 Ill.
App. 601 (1909).
39. See Jensen v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 24 Il. 2d 383, 388, 182 N.E.2d 211, 214 (1962);
Chicago City Ry. v. Shreve, 226 Ill. 530, 80 N.E. 1049 (1907).
40. 42 Ill. 2d 103, 245 N.E.2d 762 (1969).
41. Accord, McKenna v. Chicago City Ry., 296 11. 314, 129 N.E. 814 (1921); Schmidt v.
Chicago City Ry., 239 Ill.
494, 88 N.E. 275 (1909); Nau v. Standard Oil Co., 154 Ill.
App. 421
(1910).
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to the limitations on examining doctor testimony. Whether the test
results as subjective data might be admissible notwithstanding a
hearsay objection is the first issue. Whether the expert can base his
opinion on those results even if they are inadmissible is the second.
Traditionally, the Illinois cases merged the two issues. Unlike some
other jurisdictions," Illinois did not permit the examining physician
to relate subjective symptoms or statements even for the non3
hearsay purpose of explaining the basis for his expert opinion.
Expert opinion could be given in two forms. An answer could be
based on objective data collected by him." An opinion could also be
an answer to a hypothetical question based on facts properly in
evidence."
In a recent Illinois case, People v. Ward,4" the supreme court
changed its position on the second issue raised by Dickeson. This
may signal a change on the first issue. The court approved one
psychiatrist's partially basing his opinion of the defendant's sanity
on the expert medical opinion of another psychiatrist. Although the
other doctor's report had been admitted into evidence at the defendant's urging, the court stated that the witness could have permissi42. See MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 6, at §293.
43. Knowledge of subjective symptoms, alone, was not enough to disqualify the examining
physician where the opinion was itself based on objective symptoms. Jensen v. Elgin, J. &
E. Ry., 24 Ill. 2d 383, 183 N.E.2d 211 (1962); Emerton v. Canal Barge Co., 70 Il1. App. 2d 49,
216 N.E.2d 457 (1966).
Even if admitted, the opinion of an examining physician based on subjective symptoms
might constitute harmless error for the reason that independent evidence supported similar
statements related by the examining physician. See Hastings v. Abernathy Taxi Ass'n, 16
Ill. App. 3d 671, 306 N.E.2d 498 (1973); Korleski v. Needham, 77 Ill. App. 2d 328, 222 N.E.2d
334 (1966).

See generallyW.

KING &

D.

PILLNGER, A STUDY OF THE LAW OF OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS

98-104 (1942).
44. Objective data is information that is not within the patient's option as to whether he
is candid with the doctor. An X-ray is an example of objective data. See, e.g., Greinke v.
Chicago City Ry., 234 Ill. 564, 85 N.E. 327 (1908); Chicago City Ry. v. Shreve, 226 Il. 530,
80 N.E. 1049 (1907).
Objective symptoms are those which the physician discovers by examining the patient;
subjective symptoms are those which he learns from what the patient tells him. Reflexes of
the knee or foot, Hirsch v. Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 146 Ill. App. 501 (1909), increased
pulse rate, Schmidt v. Chicago City Ry., 239 Ill. 494, 88 N.E. 275 (1909), and loss of head
rotation, Backlund v. Thomas, 40 Ill. App. 2d 8, 189 N.E.2d 682 (1963), have been held to be
objective symptoms. Inability to flex finger muscles, Baines v. Chicago City Ry., 147 Ill. App.
601 (1909), and twitching of the hand, Wells Bros. Constr. v. Industrial Comm'n, 306 Ill.
191, 137 N.E. 791 (1922), have been held to be subjective symptoms because the response
was within the patient's control by exercise of voluntary muscles.
45. See People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968); Crane Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 32 Ill. 2d 348, 205 N.E.2d 425 (1965).
46. 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975). The case is discussed in Spector, People v. Ward:
Toward a Reconstruction of Expert Testimony in Illinois, 26 DEPAUL L. Rav. 284 (1977).
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bly stated an opinion based, in part, on the other doctor's opinion
even if the latter had not been admitted into evidence. Relying on
the reasoning behind Federal Rule of Evidence 703, the court noted
that since experts rely on such data in forming their opinions during
the course of diagnosing patients, they may base their testimony on
this same kind of data.4 7 The further development clearly contemplated in the federal rules" has been approved in later cases: in
order to disclose the basis of his opinion, the expert may relate the
out-of-court statements of the other experts."
No case has yet approved an opinion based upon the statements
of the patient to the examining physician. 5°' But the potential for
this development is clear. If statements by the patient are
"reasonably relied upon by experts . . in forming opinions," 5 ' then
the doctor or any expert should be able to state his opinion and state
the basis of his opinion. Obviously this extension of Ward would
greatly erode the rule that the examining physician may not relate
subjective symptoms. It is doubtful that the doctor's testimony will
be so limited if Ward is extended beyond an expert's reliance on
other experts.
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow statements of the patient to
47. In People v. Ward, 61 111. 2d 559, 567-68, 338 N.E.2d 171, 176-77 (1975), the court
adopted the particular statement in the Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule 703:
A third source contemplated by the rule consists of presentation of data to the
expert outside of court and other than by his own perception. In this respect the
rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions beyond that current in
many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of
the experts themselves when not in court. Thus a physician in his own practice
bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of considerable
variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from
nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X-rays. Most of them
are admissible in evidence, but only with the expenditure of substantial time in
producing and examining various authenticating witnesses. The physician makes
life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, expertly performed
and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.
FED. R. EvID. 703, Advisory Comm. Notes.
48. FED. R. EvID. 705.
49. See People v. Sharkey, 60 Ill. App. 3d 257, 376 N.E.2d 464 (1978); Clemons v. Alton
& S.R.R., 49 Ill. App. 3d 585, 370 N.E.2d 679 (1977); In re Smilley, 54 Il1. App. 3d 31, 369
N.E.2d 315 (1977); Smith v. Williams, 34 Ill. App. 3d 677, 339 N.E.2d 10 (1975).
50. The cases in note 49, supra, although involving statements made in part by the
patient, are examples in which his statements were admissions and therefore not technically
hearsay. FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(2)(A). So far no case has involved a "self-serving" statement.
51. FED. R. EvID. 703:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
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be related by the examining physician for the truth of the matter
stated. 2 This step is rationalized by the perceived inability of the
jury to adequately compartmentalize the permitted uses of statements of the patient 5. 3 If the Illinois courts look to the Federal Rules
of Evidence for guidance, their approval of the expert opinion may
also lead to admission of the patient's statement as substantive
evidence.
THE ALTERNATIVE PRESENTED BY FEDERAL RULE

803(4)

The proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence recommended the adoption of a hearsay exception identical in language to Federal Rule
803(4) .51 If accepted, the proposal would clarify and modify current
Illinois law concerning statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis and treatment.
Prior Illinois law has admitted statements made by persons other
than the injured party where the statements were made for purposes
of diagnosis and treatment. 5 Arguably, these instances could be
limited on the facts to parents speaking on behalf of infant children.
The federal rule implies no such limitation. This broader formulation allows greater flexibility; however, the courts may read at least
one restraint, a close relationship between the declarant and the
injured party, in order to assure the trustworthiness of the statement.
The proposed rule also extended the exception to statements
other than those made to doctors.5" As long as the declarant is attempting to obtain treatment or diagnosis, statements to any person
to whom he speaks in this effort are admissible. Adoption of this
approach could clear up the present uncertainty on this point in
Illinois without sacrificing the necessary indicia of reliability.57
Illinois law presently allows the treating physician to relate the
patient's statements as to the causation of his injuries. The federal
rule specifically allows this practice. Indeed, the Advisory CommitSee note 54 infra for text of Federal Rule 803(4).
FaD. R. EvID. 803(4), Advisory Comm. Notes.
FED. R. Evm. 803(4):
Statements of purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.-Statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment.
55. Becherer v. Best, 74 Ill. App. 2d 174, 219 N.E.2d 371 (1966); Welter v. Bowman Dairy
Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943).
56. FED. R. EvID. 803(4), Advisory Comm. Notes.
57. See text following note 9 supra.
52.
53.
54.

19791

Statements for Medical Diagnosis

tee's Note to Federal Rule 803(4) relies on the Illinois court's decision in Shell Oil as an example of the "current trend" embodied in
the rule."
The federal rule and the Illinois proposal do not define the scope
of admissible statements pertaining to causation. The federal Advisory Committee Note gives an example of the rule's operation: the
doctor might relate the patient's statement that he was struck by
an automobile, but not that the automobile had driven through a
red light and struck him. As far as it goes, the federal rule is consistent with the Illinois policy set down in Shell Oil and Gant. The
example does not deal with a difficult question: may the doctor
relate the patient's statement that defendant's automobile struck
him? In some instances, to name an instrumentality also names the
defendant. As the auto example illustrates, a statement of causation
need not tell the whole story. The rule's language limits admissibility to those statements describing "the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."5 9 It is not clear whether the
"reasonably pertinent" standard is viewed from that of the doctor's
need to know or the patient's expectation. While the latter view
would be consistent with the rationale underlying the rule,6" either
perspective would exclude statements pertaining to the identity of
the causative factor. Certainly, the doctor does not need to know
that the defendant's automobile caused the injuries in order to prescribe treatment. The patient would .also know that identity of the
actor or ownership of the instrumentality has no relationship to
effective treatment. Clarification of this point in any future reconsideration of the rule would, however, be beneficial.
The most significant change resulting from adopting a rule like
Federal Rule 803(4) would be the elimination of the distinction
between treating and non-treating doctors. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence directed its com58. FED. R. EVID. 803(4), Advisory Comm. Notes.
59. FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
60. This writer questions whether the rules of evidence should be fashioned with regard
to whether the jury can honestly apply one rule as opposed to another. If jurors cannot be
trusted, one obvious alternative, in the area under discussion, is to rule out opinion testimony
by the examining physician unless he relies on objective data or speaks in answer to a
hypothetical question. See text accompanying notes 44 and 45 supra. Of course, this approach
has met much criticism, MCCORMICK, (2d ed.), supra note 6, § 293, at 694, and its rejection
in the Federal Rules of Evidence was understandable. But the more general observation is
that juror incompetence or dishonesty is a two-edged sword in the formulation of rules of
evidence. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), overruling Delli Paoli v. United
States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
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ment on this hearsay exception solely to this distinction." Rule
803(4) is acceptable and perhaps not even controversial if corroboration of the out-of-court statements and demonstration of subjective
symptoms related by the doctor is required.
Rule 803(4)'s liberal treatment of examining physician's testimony rests on the justification that, in federal courts under Rule
703,2 a doctor could relate the -declarant's statements in order to
explain the basis for his diagnosis. Because the jury was thought to
be unable to make the distinction between using the statements for
the permitted purpose and using them for the truth of the matter
asserted, the federal approach elected to admit the statements for
all purposes.13 The rationale for 803(4) does not rest directly on
considerations of trustworthiness. If Rule 803(4) is so linked to Rule
703, then the rationale behind Rule 703 becomes important to establishing the rationale for substantive use of the statements.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 703 advance two considerations for allowing the expert to give an opinion based on facts not
admitted or admissible: the facts would be typically admissible, but
only after much time was taken to meet "technical" objections; and
the expert, typically a doctor, makes "life-and-death" decisions
based on such facts. 4 The first factor implies that the expert must
be more than a conduit for the party's case. On important factual
issues, there must be corroboration for the statements related by the
doctor. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 703 indicates
that such evidence as hospital records and statements by other hospital personnel are often admissible anyway and that, accordingly,
the doctor should have latitude to present these facts as the basis
of his opinion." The Note in no way suggests that the expert should
be the sole witness for the facts on which he relies. To the extent
that Rule 703 contemplates corroboration or the availability of corroborative material, it does not represent, in combination with Rule
803(4), a substantial change.
The present state of Illinois law, if unchanged, and the proposed
Illinois Rules of Evidence place even more emphasis on corroboration. While it may be assumed that inclusion of Rule 703 in the
proposed codification implies assent to the use of subjective statements as foundation for opinion, Rule 803(6) of the proposed evi61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 803(4), Committee Comments (Final Draft).
See note 51, supra. See also text accompanying note 47, supra.
FED. RuLE EvID. 803(4), Advisory Comm. Notes.
FED. RULE EVID. 703, Advisory Comm. Notes.
Id.
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dence code specifically excluded medical records as an exception to
the hearsay rule. 6 Under Rule 703, the doctor could have relied on
such records and even referred to the parts upon which he placed
reliance, but in-court corroboration would have been required. It
would serve no purpose to exclude a trained nurse's recorded observations during treatment unless in-court corroboration is deemed
advisable.
In theory, if the statement related by the doctor is admissible as
a hearsay exception, the finder of fact may consider it for the truth
of the matter asserted, not merely as an explanation of the expert's
premises. Even though statements may be considered in this manner, it is still theoretically possible that a special rule of corroboration might be invoked.
Weinstein and Berger suggest that the examining physician's testimony relating the injured party's statements might be admissible,
but that a verdict based solely upon such testimony as to a material
67
issue might not stand, particularly if the declarant is available.
Even this last limitation seems ill-advised. If the examining physician's testimony is admitted, not because of the trustworthiness of
the statements related, but because the jury cannot compartmentalize, it is appropriate to require corroboration even when the declarant is unavailable.
One recent federal case"' indicates that the courts may interpret
Rule 803(4) to authorize the doctor to serve as a conduit. The defendant, charged with kidnapping, raised the defense of insanity. His
psychiatrists testified at length, relying on their interviews with the
66. Hospital records were excluded from Rule 803(6)(B) of the proposed evidence code,
which continues the rule precluding admissibility established by Illinois Supreme Court Rule
236(B), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, §236(B) (1977).
PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 803(6):
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. (A) Any writing or record, whether
in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum, record or
data compilation of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible
as evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in the regular
course of any business, and if it was the regular course of the business to make such
a memorandum, record or data compilation at the time of such act, transaction,
occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances
of the making of the writing record [sic], including lack of personal knowledge by
the extrant [sic] or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but shall not affect
admissibility. (B) This rule does not apply to the introduction into evidence of
medical records or police investigative reports.
Proposed Rule 803(9), Public Records, also excludes medical records from admissibility
under that exception. PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 803(9) (Final Draft).
67. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §803(4)[01], at 803-125 to 126,
citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v Quinley, 87 F.2d 732, 733-34 (8th Cir. 1937).
68. United States v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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accused. Under Rule 803(4), the court approved admission of the
statements made by defendant to his psychiatrists. All of the factual data leading to the doctors' opinions was admissible, but none
of it was corroborated since the defendant himself did not testify. 9
Advisory Committee Notes aside, the language of the rule is broad
enough to make the expert a conduit for substantive admissibility
in all cases, as long as he is an expert and the facts are those reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Only later cases will reveal
whether corroboration will be required.
If the Illinois courts were to require corroboration' as a condition
of admitting the patient's statements through an examining physician, then adoption of Federal Rule 803(4) would not substantially
change present practice. Objective facts necessary to constitute corroboration would already be admissible, as would statements made
to treating physicians. Theoretically, the finder of fact could find
the examining doctor's testimony not only corroborated by other
facts, but also corroboration of those other facts since his testimony
is admitted for the truth of the matters stated. The fact finder,
however, may tend to discount the statements brought in through
the examining physician because of the inherent skepticism involved in a pre-trial, non-treating examination. From this standpoint, the proposed rule would make little practical difference.
CONCLUSION

Illinois has already adopted part of the rationale supporting Federal Rule 803(4). The approval of the rule itself through codification
would serve the salutary purpose of clarifying Illinois law regarding
statements made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. The ambiguities surrounding statements of causation would be lessened, and
these concerns could be eliminated with regard to the specific issue
of identity. Admissibility of statements made by those other than
the injured party or to those other than the doctor, where connected
to diagnosis or treatment, would place more facts before the jury
without jeopardizing the trustworthiness needed to support substantive use. Abolition of the treating doctor/non-treating doctor
dichotomy would serve the same purpose. Upon reconsideration of
the proposed rules, delineation of necessary corroborative facts, or
the decision to forego corroboration, would complete the reform.
69. Given the special nature of the insanity defense, the case may have no effect outside
that area. Constitutional justifications may also limit its impact to the criminal area.
70. See text following note 58 supra.

